Growth of health maintenance organisations in Nigeria and the potential for a role in promoting universal coverage efforts. by Onoka, Chima A et al.
Onoka, C.A. ; Hanson, K. ; Mills, A. (2016) [Accepted Manuscript]
Growth of health maintenance organisations in Nigeria and the poten-
tial for a role in promoting universal coverage efforts. Social science &
medicine (1982). ISSN 0277-9536 DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.06.018
(In Press)
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/2697434/
DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.06.018
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
1 
 
SSM-D-15-02225R2 
 
Growth of health maintenance organisations in Nigeria and the potential for a role in promoting 
universal coverage efforts 
 
Authors 
1. Chima A. Onoka1,2,3,*, 
2. Kara Hanson3 and   
3. Anne Mills3  
 
Author Affiliations 
1Department of Community Medicine, College of Medicine, University of Nigeria, Enugu-Campus, 
Enugu, Nigeria.  
2Health Policy Research Group, College of Medicine, University of Nigeria, Enugu-Campus, Enugu, 
Nigeria.  
3Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, UK.  
* Corresponding author: Department of Community Medicine, College of Medicine, University of 
Nigeria, Enugu-Campus, PMB 01129 UNTH Enugu, Nigeria. E-mail: chima.onoka@unn.edu.ng; Phone: 
+2348033802711 
Acknowledgements 
This study was conducted as part of research for a PhD thesis undertaken at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine by CAO whose training was funded by the Commonwealth 
Scholarship Commission. The authors are grateful to the anonymous interviewees that participated 
in the study, and reviewed the report. 
 
In Press, Social Science and Medicine 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2 
 
Growth of health maintenance organisations in Nigeria and the potential for a role in 
promoting universal coverage efforts 
 
ABSTRACT 
There has been growing interest in the potential for private health insurance (PHI) and private 
organisations to contribute to universal health coverage (UHC). Yet evidence from low and middle 
income countries remains very thin. This paper examines the evolution of health maintenance 
organisations (HMOs) in Nigeria, the nature of the PHI plans and social health insurance (SHI) 
programmes and their performance, and the implications of their business practices for providing 
PHI and UHC-related SHI programmes. An embedded case study design was used with multiple 
subunits of analysis (individual HMOs and the HMO industry) and mixed (qualitative and 
quantitative) methods, and the study was guided by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
that has its roots in the neo-classical theory of the firm. Quantitative data collection and 35 in-depth 
interviews were carried out between October 2012 to July 2013. Although HMOs first emerged in 
Nigeria to supply PHI, their expansion was driven by their role as purchasers in the government’s 
national health insurance scheme that finances SHI programmes, and facilitated by a weak 
accreditation system. HMOs’ characteristics distinguish the market they operate in as 
monopolistically competitive, and HMOs as multiproduct firms operating multiple risk pools through 
parallel administrative systems. The considerable product differentiation and consequent risk 
selection by private insurers promote inefficiencies. Where HMOs and similar private organisations 
play roles in health financing systems, effective regulatory institutions and mandates must be 
established to guide their behaviours towards attainment of public health goals and to identify and 
control undesirable business practices. Lessons are drawn for policy makers and programme 
implementers especially in those low and middle-income countries considering the use of private 
organisations in their health financing systems. 
KEY WORDS: Nigeria; universal health coverage; health maintenance organisations; national health 
insurance; private health insurance; private sector; case study 
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INTRODUCTION 
Low and middle income countries (LMIC) setting a goal of universal health coverage (UHC) should 
have effective health financing strategies and organisations (WHO, 2010). Unfortunately, the public 
organisations which are critical to UHC are weak in many LMICs (including Nigeria), prompting an 
interest in private organisations (WHO, 2011). In many LMICs, private organisations provide private 
health insurance (PHI), especially to formal private sector employees (Bitran et al., 2008; Campbell et 
al., 2000; Drechsler & Jutting, 2007; Sekhri & Savedoff, 2005; Zigora, 1996). In some countries, they 
also support publicly-funded health financing programmes (Devadasan et al., 2013; IFC, 2007).  
One way in which private firms provide PHI is by integrating the financing and provision functions 
through a set of affiliated and/or owned health providers, in order to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness. Such systems, referred to as “managed care” systems or health plans, include Health 
Maintenance Organisations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Point-of-Service 
Plans (MedlinePlus, 2010). 
HMOs emerged in Nigeria in 1996 to provide PHI primarily to formal private sector employees, like 
their counterparts in the USA (Awosika, 2007; Onoka et al., 2014). Currently, these HMOs provide 
PHI, but the coverage is still quite limited (0.48 million people, 0.3% of the population) (Awosika, 
2012). They also act as purchaser for the Social Health Insurance (SHI) programmes of the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), including the Formal Sector SHI Program (FSSHIP) for public sector 
employees, and the Tertiary Institutions’ SHI Program (TISHIP) for higher education students, which 
represent publicly-financed vehicles for expanding coverage in Nigeria. About 5 million Nigerians (3% 
of the population, mainly federal government employees and their dependants) are reportedly 
covered under the FSSHIP (Dutta & Hongoro, 2013; JLN, 2013), though the figure may be as low as 
2.35 million (Onoka et al., 2014). Although private firms are allowed to enrol with the FSSHIP, they 
have continued to opt for the PHI plans of the HMOs.  Having influenced the enactment of 
legislation that makes their enrolment in the FSSHIP voluntary, these private employers have greater 
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trust in HMOs to handle their funds (Onoka et al., 2014). TISHIP coverage is unknown. HMOs 
therefore have a central role in the plans for UHC in the country.  
The aim of this paper is to understand the potential for HMOs to play a role in a national health 
financing system that seeks to progress to UHC, by reviewing the evolution of HMOs in Nigeria, the 
nature of their health plans and their performance. The paper then analyses from a public health 
perspective the implications of their business practices in providing PHI and UHC-related, publicly 
funded SHI programmes in Nigeria.   
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis was guided by the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm that has its roots in 
the neoclassical theory of the firm (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939), and which has been modified to 
indicate bidirectional relationships between the SCP elements (Scherer & Ross, 1990; Shepherd, 
2004). As applied here, market structure considers the number of firms and their shares of the total 
products sold in the market (summarised as market concentration), how homogenous their products 
are, and the market entry conditions (Ferguson & Ferguson, 1994; Morris et al., 2007). The business 
conduct element includes the strategies adopted by HMOs in shaping their products and premiums. 
HMO performance was analysed in terms of profitability, functionality and efficiency (ILO, 2007). 
Functionality reflects the firm’s ability to carry out the health insurance function and is assessed by 
member growth rates, premium collection rates and renewal rates. Administrative cost computed as 
a percentage of total expenditure and as a share of total revenue (Mathauer & Nicolle, 2011), and 
claims ratio (which indicates the ability to provide insurance with the funds generated) (ILO, 2007) 
serve as proxies for efficiency.  
METHODS 
This exploratory study of the HMO industry in Nigeria used an embedded case study design with 
multiple subunits of analysis (Yin, 2009) and mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods to achieve 
a comprehensive understanding (Creswell, 2009). Case study designs have previously been used to 
study healthcare and health insurance markets (Denton et al., 2007; Doonan & Tull, 2010; 
5 
 
Harkreader & Imershein, 1999; Lee et al., 2001). At the primary level of analysis (industry), market 
structure elements were considered using quantitative data about HMOs’ membership and 
qualitative information about entry conditions and accounts from interview respondents of HMOs’ 
behaviours. The second level of analysis focussed on the reported business practices and 
performance of three HMOs (embedded sub-units of analysis) that were purposively selected 
following initial interactions with officials of the industry association, the Health and Managed Care 
Association of Nigeria (HMCAN), and policy makers. These HMOs had large membership, the needed 
quantitative data, and long-term experience.  Information about their behaviours was gathered from 
self-reports and reports of the behaviour of other firms in the market.  Financial information was 
obtained from interviews and from relevant documents, and is presented here in Naira and US$ at 
an average conversion rate of 1US$=N157 over the period of data collection (October 2012 to July 
2013).  Table 1 shows the methods for data collection and analysis. Interviewees and HMOs gave 
informed consent and the study received ethics approval from the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine (Ref: 6233), and the Federal Ministry of Health, Nigeria (NHREC/01/01/2007-
26/09/2012).  
FINDINGS 
Growth and Structure of HMOs in Nigeria 
The earliest HMO in Nigeria emerged in 1996 to supply PHI to private firms. Between 1996 and 1999, 
three more HMOs were established as interest in a proposed FSSHIP of the NHIS grew (Onoka et al., 
2014). HMOs were required to register only with the Corporate Affairs Commission of Nigeria to 
operate as private entities. In 1999, a military decree that established the NHIS (NHIS, 2012) also 
recognised HMOs and legitimised the subsequent accreditation of 12 HMOs as operators of the 
FSSHIP in 2004 (Onoka et al., 2014). They were reportedly given this role because policy makers 
believed that as private organisations, HMOs would implement the SHI programme more efficiently 
and effectively than the existing weak public systems.  To encourage their participation, a primary 
accreditation requirement of a share capital of 100million naira (US$ 0.64million) was waived. 
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However, the waiver also allowed the accreditation of HMOs that “had no (private) products to sell 
but were developed because the NHIS had some lives to distribute" (Policy maker), and whose 
interest was to “acquire public lives” (Policy maker). Subsequently, more HMOs were registered at 
the discretion of the NHIS, which in 2009 suspended further registration because it considered many 
of the existing HMOs “weak” (NHIS official).  
In 2011, the NHIS introduced more stringent accreditation requirements for HMOs. Existing and new 
HMOs were required to demonstrate a share capital of 400 million (US$ 2.5 million), 200 million 
(US$ 1.27 million) and 100 million naira (US$ 0.64 million) to be categorised as a national, regional or 
state HMO, respectively (NHIS, 2012). They also had to establish offices, staffed with personnel 
having a prescribed set of competencies, in their operational areas. At the end of the accreditation 
process in 2013, additional HMOs had been registered bringing the number to 76. Mergers or 
acquisitions were not reported. Five HMOs were licensed as sub-national HMOs, while others were 
considered national HMOs (NHIS, 2013). Most of the interviewees believed that the requirements 
"made way for people (such as politicians) who have money and not necessarily the technical 
expertise," (HMO manager) and those with undesirable business practices (such as copying of 
proposals, health plans and premiums, and predatory pricing) to enter or remain in the industry. To 
HMOs, the focus on share capital suggested a lack of technical capacity in the NHIS to effectively 
regulate the industry. This position was further corroborated by NHIS officials: 
A more appropriate requirement should have been to ask for reserves amounting to the level 
of incurred but not yet reported claims that are in tandem with the size of the business, to 
take care of catastrophes if they occur within your enrolment population based on the size of 
their enrolee base, and not just saying 400million. (HMO manager) 
We have a very poor capacity to regulate private health insurance because virtually everyone 
here came from the background of social health financing. (Senior NHIS official) 
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Overall, the number of HMOs increased from one in 1996 to 12 in 2004 and 62 in 2012, with a 
corresponding change in market concentration from a four-firm concentration ratio of 0.88 to 0.50 
for the private plans, and HHI of 0.24 to 0.09 (Figure 1). By 2013, there were 76 HMOs (NHIS, 2013). 
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Nature of health plans and benefits packages 
The leading HMOs in the industry started by supplying three well-defined private plans, 
distinguished by a progressively expanding set of health benefits, from which clients could choose. 
These are labelled here as standard (A), intermediate (B) and superior plan (C and C+ or deluxe). In 
order to "protect the integrity and the reputation of the industry" (HMCAN leader), HMO managers 
formed the HMCAN in 1998.  
"When there were few of us, the opportunities were many, and we could to an extent tell one 
another that certain plans could not be sold at advertised low amounts without 
compromising quality or defaulting with provider payments." (HMCAN official) 
The establishment of the NHIS in 1999 encouraged more HMOs to be set up, which then attracted 
many trained employees of existing HMOs with offers of higher salaries or greater professional 
opportunities. Given the limited technical capacity in the industry and intellectual property 
standards enforcement, it appeared to HMO respondents that the migrating personnel developed 
healthcare plans mainly by slightly modifying the benefits content, premiums and names of existing 
plans using documents in their possession. Ultimately, many HMOs ended up with “three to seven 
different (private healthcare) plans” (HMO manager), with similar labels such as “Gold”, “Standard”, 
“Platinum”, “Classic” and “Titanium” that identify them as having a common ancestry. [INSERT LINK 
TO ONLINE FILE ‘supplementary material_HMO.docx’] 
“When we go for bids with other HMOs, we have seen in the past, which is very common, a 
new HMO and even existing HMOs will just doctor (copy) your own proposal (including 
benefits) and only change names (labels) of our plans.” (HMO marketing manager) 
Such behaviours were reported to lead to distrust among HMOs such that a leading HMO withdrew 
from HMCAN to shield itself from predatory behaviours of competitors. When HMCAN undertook an 
actuarial analysis of the industry’s healthcare plans in 2007, some HMOs were unwilling to submit 
data and others submitted inaccurate data. As noted by a HMCAN leader, the influence of HMCAN 
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was diminished by these events, and some HMOs subsequently failed to honour their financial 
obligations to it.  
As HMOs increased in number, they also sought opportunities to supply additional private products. 
For instance, some HMOs developed informal sector plans, some of which were hugely subsidized by 
international donors or private organisations (Humphreys, 2010). Recognising that “companies 
usually have different cadres of staff” (HMO head), HMOs also developed varieties of health plans in 
response to employers’ request to have basic health plans, which offered junior employees some 
“opportunity to access quality medical services” (HMO marketing head), and plans with more 
comprehensive benefits for senior staff.  HMOs felt that the inclusion of highly expensive deluxe 
plans for owners and directors incentivised them to buy plans for their employees.  
Growing competition also stimulated opportunistic behaviours among HMOs that sought to supply 
public plans. For instance, in 2004, a leading HMO sought the endorsement of policy makers to serve 
as the monopoly supplier of the proposed FSSHIP, but resistance from other HMOs led to a proposal 
for HMOs to compete for government agencies (Onoka et al., 2014). The subsequent observation 
that a new HMO had allegedly secured the endorsement of half of the targeted government 
agencies with promises of financial favours was felt to have been influential in leading policy makers 
to adopt a mechanism in which the NHIS allocated beneficiaries to HMOs on the basis of their 
financial and infrastructural endowments. Latterly, additional allocations were devoid of a defined 
mechanism. At some point, newer HMOs, demanding fairness, were reported to have 
(unsuccessfully) pressured the NHIS to redistribute beneficiaries of the FSSHIP. 
"None of these HMOs is perfect; so why would all these people (public agencies)… overnight, 
decide that they were going along with one?" (Policy maker) 
“You know any ‘allocation mechanism’ (emphasis) has things that are behind it. What one 
can argue about is the fairness and equity in the allocation. What are the guidelines for 
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allocation between A, B, C, D? There is none! I like you, I give you some." (Former NHIS 
official) 
The integration of HMOs as key operators of the FSSHIP was felt to have positioned them to act as 
implementers of the TISHIP of the NHIS in 2009. Interested HMOs took advantage of the TISHIP 
guidelines that allowed them “to prepare a customized benefit package if they so wish” (NHIS 
guideline, 2012), to modify and supply health plans that were acceptable to university authorities. 
Premiums were paid by students as part of their school fees, and the university authorities 
transferred contributions to contracted HMOs. 
Table 2 shows HMOs’ health plans as at 2013, namely, the public (NHIS) healthcare plans (FSSHIP 
and TISHIP) and the private plans (for the formal and informal private sector), and the differences in 
providers, benefit entitlements and contract terms. Table 3 compares the benefit entitlements of 
their private plans, TISHIP and FSSHIP. The private plans (standard (A), intermediate (B) and superior 
plan (C and C+ or deluxe) relate to the three conventional health plans developed by the earliest 
HMOs. Informal sector plans represent slight modifications of HMOs’ basic plans. 
Benefits lists also include restrictions. For instance, dental care is included in various plans but the 
actual benefit may be limited to a few dental procedures. Similarly, though surgery is included in all 
plans, the benefit limit may be N100,000 (US$637) in a basic plan, but up to N300,000 (US$1,911) for 
a higher cost plan. Providers are also restricted.  
“There are hospitals set up for the elites and they are not cheap; we always have the one you 
want based on your pocket” (HMO marketing manager).  
Premiums for private health plans 
Strategies for setting premiums 
For a few earlier and leading HMOs (including one studied in-depth), premium setting involved 
actuarial analysis that considered actual fee-for-service expenditure, administrative cost and desired 
profits. This was reported to have been possible because these HMOs had invested in the data 
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management infrastructure required to analyse utilisation and expenditures, and had also recruited 
actuaries. Nonetheless, primary care cost data and capitation rates were imperfectly estimated 
because “providers do not give us their utilisation records” (HMCAN leader).  
Recognising that actuaries were few and very expensive to hire, and that data management 
infrastructure was costly, it appeared that many HMOs relied on rates obtained from HMCAN’s 
actuarial analysis, despite its inaccuracy. A HMO manager admitted using premiums of HMOs that 
carried out actuarial analysis as a gauge for the simple “in-house actuarial analysis” undertaken by 
managers without actuary training, who took into account their own administrative costs and 
assumptions about probability of illness.  
“Few HMOs ever have brush with actuaries; some don’t even know where actuaries exist but 
they are selling products.” (HMO unit manager)  
“Doing actuarial analysis is not that complex right now. We don’t have high deductible, low 
deductible, and all those variations are not there… it’s mostly when it is individuals that are 
buying that we factor in risk.” (A HMO manager) 
Interviewees noted that many newer HMOs, would simply set premiums lower than those of HMOs 
that undertake actuarial analysis, who they believe would have inflated their prices to account for 
profits and medical losses.  Consequently, both “undercutting” (presenting lower premiums to firms 
for defined health plans already proposed by other HMOs) and “low-balling” (adoption of lower than 
appropriate prices for defined health plans) reportedly existed in the market. This situation was said 
to be responsible for HMOs’ reluctance to share premium information in proposals and with the 
NHIS and academic researchers. 
“Some HMOs take 3 or 4 rates and put them together, ‘this one is 20,000 (Naira) and this one 
is 17,000. Okay, let us put ours at 15,000.’” (HMO manager) 
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“There is a lot of low-balling and under-cutting. In fact, there are some businesses that we 
lost like that even though you know that due to current realities, no one can provide that 
package at that price.” (HMO owner/manager) 
“We do competitor analysis. Sometimes, you have to find where to get the information 
(about proposals of others) so as not to out-price yourself.” (HMO marketing unit manager) 
Client-related considerations 
As shown in Table 2, premiums for private plans exceeded those proposed in 2013 for individuals 
that wanted to join the NHIS programmes on a voluntary basis, despite the latter’s more generous 
benefits (Table 2).  Informants suggested that this apparent anomaly could be explained by a mix of 
higher expectations of efficient service from private employers and their lack of confidence in the 
NHIS administrative processes. HMOs offered discounts to purchasers of more expensive plans and 
bulk purchasers (Table 2), and excluded elderly dependents. Premiums for individual and family-
based private plans were risk-rated. Individuals with hypertension, diabetes, sickle cell disease or 
kidney disease were either excluded or offered higher premiums. Higher premiums or long waiting 
periods were applied for immediate coverage for pregnancy-related and surgical care. 
Discounts were not available in informal sector plans. However, one HMO was able to offer lower 
premiums by restricting beneficiaries to a few focal health providers that agreed to receive lower 
capitation in return for large beneficiary clusters. According to its owner, the HMO used freelance 
staff, remunerated on a pay-for-performance basis, to promote its products, recruit members and 
collect premiums, and in so doing, to control expenditure. 
HMOs’ response to demands for price changes 
Interviewees generally reported a tendency for HMOs to maintain constant premiums over periods 
of three to five years, despite rising operational expenditures or demands for higher payments by 
healthcare providers. It appeared that they were afraid of losing existing members to competitors 
mainly due to undercutting. While older and more established HMOs were said to occasionally take 
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the risk of raising their premiums because of their reputation among members, or due to external 
changes (especially in government policies), newer ones were reported to respond by adjusting 
benefits to match their clients’ premium offers.  
“We are faced with much heat of increasing providers’ payments, but cannot readily 
translate that to the clients. That is one of the reasons our (medical) loss ratio is rising.” 
(HMO head) 
“Many HMOs are willing to adjust the benefit package and give you something that you 
want; what your money can afford.” (HMO marketing unit head)  
Non-price based strategies employed by HMOs for private plans 
“The major determinant of success (retention) is the ability to render quality service specified 
in the benefit package… it is not just because premiums are higher that companies move (to 
other HMOs).” (HMO medical unit manager) 
[INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE ‘supplementary material_HMO.docx’] 
Premised on their owners’ assumption that many Nigerians associate quality with availability of 
medical doctors, some HMOs (especially those owned/managed by medical doctors) appeared to be 
intentionally advertised as “medically-run”, “medically-managed”, “medically-driven” or “medically-
focused” HMOs on their product documents and webpages. It was felt that this strategy would 
“make people believe that since doctors know more about healthcare, they make sure that their 
providers deliver quality care.” (A HMO marketing manager). Secondly, to gain a reputation for 
effective service delivery systems, bigger HMOs also extensively advertised their investments in 24-
hour electronic member support systems, data processing infrastructure, data management staff, 
and actuaries. Respondents believed that these enhanced systems would convince clients to 
overlook competitors that offered cheap premiums because they lacked utilisation data and would 
later compromise on service quality. Such HMOs also adopted a “territorial marketing” approach to 
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advertisement (HMO marketing unit head) that involved observing, revisiting and courting 
dissatisfied firms with testimonies and promises of better service quality. Thirdly, HMOs formed by 
banks advertised their link with a reputable bank “group” with a huge capital deposit, seemingly to 
attract clients that were concerned about the long-term safety of their contributions. Others 
displayed their membership of a group or consortium of insurance, oil and gas, and international 
managed care companies.  
Performance of HMOs 
The FSSHIP accounted for a larger population of HMOs’ beneficiaries compared to private plans 
(Table 4). The considerable interest of HMOs in the FSSHIP appeared to stem from its potential 
profitability, which was felt to arise from beneficiaries’ lack of information about its benefits, and 
sparing use of services. In addition, HMOs did not compete for FSSHIP members based on premiums, 
and the administrative and promotional expenditures were mainly borne by the NHIS.  
Furthermore, HMOs appeared to see the FSSHIP capitation payments which they received regularly 
from the NHIS as “guaranteed income” (HMO manager). Interest earned from such funds deposited 
with banks could help compensate for vagaries in financial flows in their private plans. For the earlier 
HMOs that initially had only private plans, participation in the FSSHIP was reportedly “life-saving” 
(HMO manager/owner) and the growth of one such HMO was remarkably “powered by the 
establishment of Nigeria’s National Insurance Fund (NHIS)” (IFC, 2007). 
"If you look at the books of all HMOs today, you will note that they make their money from 
social health insurance. But if you ask them, they will give the impression that they make 
more money from private health plans, but it's a big lie." (Policy maker) 
“It took us 7 years to break even, during which we survived on bank interest from other 
savings.” (HMO owner). 
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Regarding TISHIP, the numbers of plans were inconsistently recorded. Despite its very competitive 
price, HMOs considered it potentially profitable and operated it because it targeted healthy students 
who used services sparingly. Additionally, considerable membership could be gained from a single 
contract with a university. 
“People sell (TISHIP plans for) 1,600 naira and some even less. We made a decision not to go 
below 1,600 even though it is far more expensive. But you see, because of others (competing 
HMOs) you are forced to sell at 1600.” (HMO Manager) 
The membership of HMOs private plans was small (Table 4). Additionally, companies occasionally 
dropped out or fell behind in their payments, and HMO managers were of the view that such 
behaviours existed because regulatory systems lacked explicit and implementable arbitration 
mechanisms and sanctions for defaulters. Nonetheless, the three HMOs studied still achieved 
renewal rates of about 80% and premium collection rates of 79% - 90% (Table 4).  
Despite the more generous benefits and cheaper premium of the FSSHIP compared to HMOs’ private 
plans, interviewees felt that private firms did not seem interested in the FSSHIP for three main 
reasons, largely related to HMOs’ behaviours. First, many HMOs allowed some private firms that had 
cash flow challenges to delay premium payment or pay in instalments, was not the case with the 
FSSHIP. Secondly, beneficiaries of private plans seemingly considered HMOs more responsive and 
more focused on consumer satisfaction, compared to their behaviours towards FSSHIP beneficiaries. 
Thirdly, it appeared easy for private firms whose staff repeatedly to have problems with accessing 
and using healthcare services to opt for new HMOs, unlike what obtained in the FSSHIP.  
Several factors diminished the potential profits from private plans and help explain HMOs’ 
desperation to participate in the FSSHIP. The competitive strategies adopted in the HMO market 
appeared to limit their profits, and for HMO B, led to a rising claims ratio (see Table 4) as they were 
unable to raise premiums over a 5-year period despite increasing provider demands. HMO C 
reportedly raised its premiums to accommodate such changes but mainly retained clients for whom 
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it had a reputation for quality. The substantial costs of manually collecting and processing utilisation 
data from providers, verifying claims and paying multiple providers (numbering up to 200) monthly 
and separately (for private and public plans) using couriered bank drafts, were common to both 
public and private plans. However, HMO managers were of the view that private plans accounted for 
most of their administrative costs (Table 4) including the costs of marketing, advertising, setting 
premiums, negotiating and renegotiating reimbursement levels, maintaining beneficiary support 
systems, and litigation for debt recovery. Unfortunately, restricted access to, and limited 
disaggregation of expenditure data meant that the share of the cost elements and the differences 
across HMOs could not be examined to verify their reports.  
 
Finally, HMOs’ informal sector plans were abandoned because of their low profits, such that only 
four HMOs known to advertise such plans actually developed them. For instance, one HMO reported 
a claims ratio of 111% for its informal sector plan in 2011, owing to a high rate of caesarean sections. 
Nonetheless, the strategy of providing such plans was believed to promote the reputation of the 
HMO as “…a major player in the industry” (HMO head) with a wide business scale, the capacity to 
manage informal sector programmes or “community based insurance” for interested local and 
international organisations, and “prestige” (HMO owner/manager) that demonstrated corporate 
social responsibility. 
DISCUSSION 
This study is the first systematic analysis of the business practices of HMOs in LMICs. It has 
presented information on their evolution, structural characteristics, and business strategies that 
influence the number, benefits and premiums of their health plans and their performance. The 
findings provide a basis for characterising the HMO industry in Nigeria, and from a public health 
perspective, assessing their role and business practices in providing PHI and UHC-related SHI 
programmes in Nigeria.   
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Although HMOs first emerged in Nigeria to supply PHI, they grew because of a public policy that 
encouraged their use in the government’s NHIS, and a weak accreditation system. By 2004, the four-
firm market concentration ratio (CR4) was in excess of 40%, interpreted by Scherer and Ross (1990) 
as suggestive of oligopoly. However, the limited barriers to entry, the existence of differentiated 
health plans, and the subsequent decrease in HHI to levels corresponding to low concentration 
(USDOJ, 2010), distinguish the market as monopolistically competitive (Parkin et al., 2008; Varian, 
2010).  
The categories of HMOs’ health plans, including public (FSSHIP and TISHIP) and a variety of private 
plans (for the formal and informal sectors) constitute multiple health insurance pools, which are 
common in health financing systems of LMICs (Mills & Ranson, 2005). The FSSHIP included a 
uniform, more comprehensive benefit package available to all beneficiaries for relatively lower 
premiums, and allowed greater provider choice compared with private plans. Conversely, private 
plans were intentionally differentiated, and constituted multiple pools that served segmented 
groups. In practice, the TISHIP represented a private product, except that its minimum price and 
benefit entitlements were fixed by the regulator.  As providers of these four plans, HMOs in Nigeria 
are multiproduct private firms operating multiple pools through multiple administrative activities, 
and having the potential to behave differently in each pool (to increase their market shares and 
maximise profits) and to operate inefficiently.  
In their provision of private plans, HMOs were characterised by poor information about costs and 
expensive business practices that promoted inefficiencies, including market segmentation, product 
differentiation, and non-price competition. Poor information coupled with the scarcity of actuarial 
analysts contributed to inaccurate premium estimation. From the firm’s perspective, product 
differentiation strategies can be a profit maximising strategy. However, product differentiation and 
promotion are costly and encourage waste. There was some degree of price competition, but 
unfortunately this was premised on predatory pricing rather than actual cost information. The 
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evidence supports suggestions that competition could lead to adoption of pricing strategies that are 
detrimental to the economic stability of private insurers (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006). Such behaviours, 
coupled with poor regulation, have the potential to undermine the stability of members’ benefits. 
Unsurprisingly, the outcome of competition in the private market included situations observed in 
other developing country settings (Awosika, 2007; Bitran et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2000; 
Drechsler & Jutting, 2007; Sekhri & Savedoff, 2005; Zigora, 1996): PHI coverage is low and focuses on 
private formal sector employees, poorer groups are excluded, multiple pools exist, premiums are 
relatively high for benefits compared to the SHI programme, and insurer health care and 
administrative expenditures are high due to inefficient practices. Remarkably, private firms still 
prefer to take on PHI plans rather than the SHI programme, possibly because they trust them more. 
HMOs’ private plans are also limited as instruments for mobilising prepayment contributions from 
the large informal sector workforce in Nigeria because they are unprofitable. 
For the public plans, the uniform nature of the FSSHIP means that HMOs do not have to promote the 
products, which should make SHI more efficient than the private plans. In contrast, the TISHIP, 
though labelled a SHI programme has in practice become like the differentiated private plans of 
HMOs. As shown earlier, HMOs’ private plans for poorer groups, junior firm employees and informal 
sector groups, excluded or restricted important benefits such as maternal healthcare while less 
healthy groups were either excluded or charged risk-rated premiums. To the extent that such 
business practices apply to the TISHIP, the targets are provided with differential benefits and 
premiums through multiple pools and in ways that encourage both inefficiencies and inequities.   
The analysis here underscores the need to critically examine public-private partnerships that are 
emerging in healthcare financing systems in LMIC, about which little is known. Policy makers’ 
interests in and use of HMOs was initially motivated by perceived weaknesses in the health system 
in the 1990s (Onoka et al., 2014), which continue today. HMOs have become a powerful interest 
group and having played a significant role in establishing the NHIS’ programmes, have become 
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entrenched within the health financing system that seeks to progress to UHC. This partnership is 
supporting a policy design for TISHIP that makes it a private plan in practice rather than social health 
insurance as the name implies, and a regulatory system that fails to ensure that public funds are 
used to achieve desirable public goals of equity and efficiency. It also fails to control undesirable 
behaviours of HMOs in relation to their private plans.  
Where HMOs or other private financing organisations are being used for UHC-related health 
financing programmes in LMICs, the policy guiding the public-private arrangement should be 
structured to promote the use of their infrastructural, financial and technical capacity to promote 
public health goals. For example, the premiums and benefits of public programmes they supply 
should be wholly determined by a publicly-led purchaser at national or sub-national levels, as is 
done for the FSSHIP, rather than leaving HMOs to determine such features as in the TISHIP. Where 
they supply PHI, its role should be clearly defined so that its contribution or negative impact can be 
observed and controlled to preclude negative consequences on UHC. As in other settings, PHI can 
still provide substitute coverage to people in the private sector who are able to pay for it (Mossialos 
& Thomson, 2002; Pauly et al., 2006) provided they are effectively regulated (Sekhri & Savedoff, 
2005, 2006). Policy makers can also learn from private sector innovations to reduce inefficiencies 
such as the strategy of purchasing services for a large pool of beneficiaries from a limited set of 
providers, which enabled one HMO to charge lower premiums for informal sector plans. 
Achieving effective regulation will require the implementation of effective governance 
arrangements. Essentially, the NHIS needs explicit frameworks for regulation, which should be 
implemented by independent organisations, as suggested elsewhere (FMOH, 2003). Otherwise, the 
conflicts of interests that arise from the NHIS’ multiple roles, of SHI organiser and regulator, and PHI 
and HMO regulator, and the fact that HMOs participated strongly in shaping the development of 
regulatory guidelines being implemented by the NHIS, will continue to impede regulation. A basic 
minimum benefit package can be prescribed for PHI plans by the government (as is the case for 
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medical aid schemes in South Africa), and only insurers that comply can be provided with operating 
licences. Government requirements that insurers display the prices and healthcare plans and 
provide information necessary to guide a consumers’ choice of insurer, have potential to 
significantly control HMOs’ prices if deployed in Nigeria. HMOs in the USA report their data 
(including administrative expenditures) to analysts (Sherlock, 2009). Such information enables the 
examination of organisational behaviours and performance (USDOJ, 2010), and can use the 
variations in behaviours within the industry to identify and control the HMOs with undesirable 
behaviours. HMOs’ behaviours related to their private plans, which seem to limit the interest of 
private firms in the FSSHIP should be examined and addressed. For instance, the NHIS can ensure 
that HMOs extend positive behaviours such as consumer satisfaction strategies to FSSHIP 
beneficiaries. Regulation can also be enhanced if the NHIS gives greater recognition to the important 
role of HMCAN in encouraging positive behaviours amongst members.  
Limitations and strengths of the study 
Information was obtained on the entire industry. Data from multiple sources that included policy 
makers and the leaders of the umbrella association of HMOs (the HMCAN) were triangulated. 
However, the generalisability of the findings is limited nature of the evidence, which reflects 
interviewees perceptions, and the outcome of the interviewer’s and interviewees interaction.  For 
instance, In-depth analysis focused on three relatively large HMOs, whose views and experiences, 
and context might differ from those of smaller ones. 
HMOs were generally averse to sharing information, with one HMO declining to participate, citing 
the risk of granting competitors access to business secrets in a poorly regulated business 
environment. Since the regulator did not collect information on the premiums of private plans, 
analysis of price competition using quantitative methods was impossible.  The extent of cost-shifting 
among the different plans could not be examined due to lack of data. Nonetheless, the case study 
approach provided insights into actual business behaviours of individual firms, which contrasts with 
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cross-sectional neo-classical economic methods that provide aggregate information (Ferguson & 
Ferguson, 1994).  
CONCLUSION 
This analysis provides insight into the private HMOs industry in one large middle income country. 
These findings support the adoption of a critical position towards PHI in efforts to promote UHC in 
such settings, and the need to be careful with designing policies that hand roles to private 
organisations for publicly-funded UHC-related programmes. Where HMOs and similar private 
organisations play a role in health financing systems, effective regulatory institutions and mandates 
must be established to guide their behaviours towards attainment of public health goals, and to 
identify and reprimand those engaged in undesirable business behaviours. Given the evidence here 
on HMOs’ PHI plans and their experiences, further research is needed to explore why private firms 
are still reluctant to embrace the more comprehensive SHI programme, a step that should generate 
a more inclusive and effective national SHI pool.  
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Figure 1: Change in the market concentration 1996 - 2011 
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Table 1: Methods for data collection and analysis 
Target Method 
General information about the HMO 
industry  
Quantitative data for assessing 
performance  
Review of National Health Insurance Scheme Act, 
operational guidelines for NHIS programmes, NHIS 
publications related to HMOs, HMOs’ advert documents, 
records and reports 
In-depth information on existing 
healthcare plans, and HMOs’ 
business strategies 
35 In-depth interviews with officials of the NHIS and 
HMOs’ association, and the heads, owners, managers 
and unit heads of three HMOs, and policy makers 
Additional information about health 
plans and promotion strategies 
Examination of existing websites of the NHIS and several 
including the following: 
www.clearlinehmo.com [Accessed 16/01/2014] 
www.healthcare-ng.com [Accessed 16/01/2014] 
www.hygeiagroup.com [Accessed 10/01/2014] 
www.ihmsnigeria.com [Accessed 10/01/2014] 
www.metrohealthhmo.com [Accessed 20/03/2014] 
www.nonsuchhmo.com [Accessed 06/05/2014] 
www.oceanichealthng.com [Accessed 02/03/2014] 
www.precioushealthcarehmo.com [Accessed 16/01/14] 
www.precioushealthcarehmo.com [Accessed 
16/01/2014] 
www.premiumhealthltd.com [Accessed 16/01/2014] 
www.songhaihealthtrust.com [Accessed 02/03/2014] 
www.sterlinghealthmcs.com [Accessed 02/03/2014] 
www.totalhealthtrust.com [Accessed 10/01/2014] 
www.zenithmedicare.com [Accessed 16/01/2014] 
Market concentration Quantitative analysis of HMO and beneficiary numbers to 
determine concentration ratio (CR) that represents the 
sum of the market shares of the largest firms in the 
market, and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) that 
takes all firms into consideration (Morris et al., 2007). 
Performance indicators Estimation of Proportions and ratios 
Data organisation and reduction QSR NVivo 9 software 
Data interpretation  Initial inductive reasoning to provide insight into 
accumulated data, and a complementary deductive 
approach to relate the data to themes in the conceptual 
framework, and enhance interpretive understanding of 
data (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006) 
Data integration, description and 
interpretive analysis 
Interactive and reflexive examination of data from all 
sources and triangulation to test validity of evidence 
Requests for additional data and interviews as required 
Review of report by selected interviewees 
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Table 2: Characteristics of the health plans supplied by HMOs 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE 
Name of plan FSSHIP TISHIP FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR 
Initiator  NHIS NHIS HMOs HMOs 
Target beneficiaries Public and private (formal) sector 
employees 
Higher education students Private sector employers and 
employees, individuals and families 
Informal sector employees, 
urban and rural “communities”  
Choice of HMO Determined by NHIS Determined by school 
administrators  
Determined by firms, and individuals Determined by target group 
Benefit entitlements 
within HMO and across 
HMO 
Homogenous  Differentiated Differentiated Differentiated across HMOs; 
Homogenous within groups but 
may be heterogeneous across 
groups 
Nature of premiums Employees should pay a fixed 
share of their salary and the 
employer pays twice the amount 
Varies based on the additional 
entitlements; (Minimum yearly 
premium of 1600 naira (US$10.2) is 
recommended by the NHIS) 
Flat rates within groups but variable 
across groups and HMOs 
 
Flat rates within groups but 
variable across groups and 
HMOs 
 
Discounts None None  Average premiums for staff strength ≥ 
20 versus <20: 
- Individual plan - 62.7% (Plan A), 
53.2% (Plan B), 71.3% (Plan C;  
- Family plan - 65.1% (Plan A), Plan B 
(61.0%), Plan C (69.8%) 
None 
 
Co-payment 10% of prescription charge None None Variable  
Revenue collection Government transfers employee 
funds to NHIS; NHIS reallocates 
the funds to HMOs 
Students pay premiums along with 
annual sessional fees; Institution 
then allots to HMOs 
Firms allots staff premiums to HMO; 
Individuals and families pay directly to 
HMO 
HMO collects directly from 
leaders of groups and 
individual members 
Frequency of premium 
payment to HMO 
Quarterly  Annually Quarterly, but in practice, mostly 
monthly depending on the client 
Monthly, and in some cases, 
weekly 
Risk Pool Single overall pool (NHIS) 
 
Multiple Multiple Multiple 
Choice of primary 
provider 
Members choose from a 
generous range of NHIS 
accredited primary, secondary 
and tertiary facilities 
Restricted to the medical centre of 
the School 
Beneficiaries choose from a list of 
HMOs’ preferred providers 
Determined by HMO  
Waiting times     
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- Access to services 90 days Immediate  14 – 30 days 30 days 
- Change of provider 60 days Not applicable 30 days 30 days 
- Authorisation of 
secondary care  
24 hours 24 hours 24 hours 24 hours 
Suspension of benefit 
following failure to pay 
Not applicable because NHIS 
always pays though short delays 
may occur 
No experience Immediate, but in practice, variable 
depending on nature of, and previous 
experience with client 
Immediate  
Sources: Websites (Table 1) and publicity material of HMOs and NHIS 
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Table 3: Similarities and differences in the benefits packages and associated premiums of healthcare plans during 2012-2013 period 
 FSSHIP TISHIP BASIC†  PRIVATE 
 
 
   Standard† Intermediate† High† 
 
Preventive 
care 
Immunization as it applies in the National Programme on Immunization, and health 
and family planning education 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual medical checks unrelated to illness No  No No Yes** 
Primary care Out-patient care, including necessary consumables as in NHIS standard treatment 
guidelines and referral protocol 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Prescribed drugs and diagnostic tests as contained in the NHIS Drugs List and NHIS 
Diagnostic Test Lists 
Yes (generic 
prescriptions) 
Yes Yes (branded 
drugs allowed) 
Yes (branded 
drugs allowed) 
 Basic laboratory investigations (Haemoglobin estimation, urine and stool analysis, 
blood grouping, Fasting/random blood sugar) 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
 Accident and emergency care Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maternal & 
child health 
Ante-natal, delivery and post-natal care (for mother and baby) for 4 pregnancies 
ending in live births and healthcare if still birth occurs 
No No Variable Yes 
 Twelve-week post-natal care for preterm/premature babies of beneficiaries No No  Variable Variable 
 Treatment of basic gynaecological problems Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Caesarean sections No No Yes* Yes 
Secondary & 
tertiary care 
Consultation with specialists including physicians, paediatricians, obstetricians, 
gynaecologists, general and specialist surgeons, radiologists, psychiatrists, 
ophthalmologists, physiotherapists, etc. 
Yes (diagnosis 
and treatment) 
Yes (diagnosis 
only) 
Yes (diagnosis 
and 
treatment)* 
Yes (diagnosis 
and 
treatment)* 
 Hospital care in a standard ward for a cumulative 21 days per year following referral Yes Standard 
ward* 
Semi-private to 
private rooms* 
Private rooms 
 A range of prostheses (limited to prosthesis produced in Nigeria) No No No  Variable 
 Eye examination and care, the provision of low priced spectacles but excluding 
contact lenses. 
Examination 
and care only 
No Variable Yes 
 Dental care (dental check, scaling and polishing, minor surgeries, replacement of ≤4 
dentures) 
Yes No Variable Yes** 
 Advanced laboratory investigations including HIV screening, Hepatitis, ≥2 Ultrasound 
scans 
No No No Yes 
 Hospital stay for patients that had cerebrovascular accident (up to 12 cumulative 
weeks), orthopaedic cases (up to 6 cumulative weeks) 
No No No Variable 
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Exclusion Occupational injuries, injuries from disasters, epidemics, extreme sports, cosmetic 
surgery, IVF, treatment of congenital abnormalities, family planning commodities, 
special dental procedures (e.g. crowns, bleaching), treatment of HIV/AIDS, cancer, 
transplants 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
High technology investigations e.g. CT scan, MRI: the HMO would pay 50% of cost. 
Dialysis (maximum of 6 sessions) 
Total exclusion Total 
exclusion 
Total exclusion Variable 
Expenditure 
limits 
No No US$0-3000 US$0-6000 US$0-12000 
Premium per 
person† 
N15,000 for voluntary contributors N1,600 
(US$10.2) – 
N15,500 
(US$98.7) 
N13,500 
(US$86.0)- 
<N30,000 
(US$191.1) 
N30,000 
(US$191.1)– 
N50,000 
(US$318.5) 
>N50,000 
(US$318.5) 
Sources: Websites (Table 1) and publicity material of HMOs and NHIS 
*Expenditure limits apply   
**Additional benefits for deluxe plans but expenditure limits may apply  
Yes (Included); No (Not included) 
† See text for description of pricing behaviours in practice. 
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Table 4: Basic market performance indices of selected HMOs 
 HMO A HMO B HMO C 
Total number of members covered by 
FSSHIP (Dependents/Principal ratio) 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
 
 
169704 (2.1) 
170000 (2.2) 
163400 (1.9) 
177894 (1.9) 
 
 
101509 (2.3) 
102751 (2.3) 
95131 (1.9) 
98511 (1.9) 
 
 
164906 (1.9) 
158569 (1.9) 
165124 (1.8) 
167529 (1.8) 
Total number of members covered by 
formal private plans (Dependents/Principal 
ratio) 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
 
 
36982 (0.87) 
53664 (0.89) 
61498 (0.83) 
72160 (0.93) 
 
 
9086 (0.93) 
15546 (0.98) 
13875 (0.93) 
22678 (0.93) 
 
 
36446 (0.86) 
55894 (0.86) 
63297 (0.93) 
62085 (0.94) 
Renewal rates for private plans 
2011 
2012 
 
81.3% 
78.3% 
 
79.8% 
74.6% 
 
81.6% 
80.2% 
Premium collection rate (premiums 
collected as % of premium due) 
2009 
2010 
2011 
 
 
81.5% 
87.8% 
83.2% 
 
 
84.7% 
86.7% 
89.9% 
 
 
79.6% 
82.1% 
80.1% 
Administrative expenditure as % of total 
expenditure 
2009 
2010 
2011 
 
 
25.2% 
27.7% 
29.4% 
 
 
26.8% 
22.5% 
30.3% 
 
 
29.1% 
34.2% 
28.8% 
Administrative expenditure as % of 
premiums earned 
2009 
2010 
2011 
 
 
20.7% 
24.1% 
30.8% 
 
 
25.2% 
22.0% 
23.7% 
 
 
20.0% 
21.5% 
25.4% 
Claims ratio (total claims as a % of total 
premiums) 
2009 
2010 
2011 
 
 
74.5% 
72.3% 
67.2% 
 
 
68.7% 
75.7% 
75.3% 
 
 
79.1% 
77.3% 
72.4% 
Sources: calculated from administrative, enrolment and financial records 
 
 
 
 
 
 
